Abstract. We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. The characterization implies equilibrium existence results. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi-supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to derive general results for certain classes of ordinal games. It is motivated by the increasingly important role that ordinal properties have played in game-theoretic analysis in recent years. First of all, the introduction of supermodular games by Topkis (1979) and the subsequent analysis by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) , Vives (1990) , and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) gave rise to an important new strand of literature in economics and game theory. But strategic complementarity, the key ingredient of supermodularity, is essentially an ordinal concept and much of the theory of supermodular games can be formulated in ordinal terms. Second, since the seminal paper by Monderer and Shapley (1996) , a sizeable strand of literature on potential games has emerged. Monderer and Shapley already distinguish between exact, weighted, and ordinal potentials for cardinal games. Kukushkin (1999) and Norde and Patrone (2001) have introduced the concept of ordinal potential for ordinal games.
Ordinality in strategic games stands for two different, not mutually exclusive concepts. On the one hand, within the confines of traditional game theory, an ordinal perspective abstracts from particular utility representations (payoff functions). It considers invariant properties with respect to utility representations. It identifies games having the same game form and identical ordinal preferences or identical best response correspondences. More generally, it investigates isomorphisms and equivalence classes of games. For the ordinal perspective of games, see the contributions of Thompson (1952) , Mertens (1987 Mertens ( , 2003 , Vermeulen and Jansen (2000) , and Morris and Ui (2004) . On the other hand, the concept of ordinal games transcends tra-ditional game theory and allows for players' preferences which do not admit utility representations. Many contributions to demand theory and general equilibrium theory consider incomplete or intransitive preferences. Sonnenschein (1971), Shafer (1974) , Kim and Richter (1986) made pioneering contributions to demand theory with incomplete or intransitive preferences. Schmeidler (1969) , Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) , Bergstrom (1976) , Borglin and Keiding (1976), Shafer (1976) belong to the early contributors to general equilibrium theory with incomplete or intransitive preferences. To the extent that the work of these and subsequent authors deals with abstract economies (generalized games, pseudo-games), it applies to ordinal games as well.
Incomplete or intransitive preferences constitute an important, but not the only class of preferences without utility representations. Specifically, the present paper deals with ordinal games where players' preference relations are weak orders: Players' preferences are complete and transitive, yet need not admit utility representations. As mentioned above, both potential games and supermodular games lend themselves to ordinal analysis. Notice that in contrast to arbitrary finite games, both finite potential games and finite supermodular games always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In both cases, a purely ordinal approach can be taken. The arguments differ from the standard equilibrium existence proofs by means of the Brouwer, Kakutani, or Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem, which require a topological vector space structure and continuity in that topology.
To begin with, we introduce the concept of ordinal Nash equilibrium for ordinal games. In the case of potential games, no fixed point theorem is needed. We extend Voorneveld's (2000) concept of best-response potential from cardinal games to ordinal games in our sense and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. As corollary, we obtain that if an ordinal game is a potential game, then it is a best-response potential game. In the case of supermodular games, one can resort to the lattice-theoretic, non-topological fixed point theorem of Zhou (1994) . Next Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) concept of quasi-supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games in our sense. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. As an immediate corollary, one obtains that the ordinal Nash equilibria of a finite quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. In sum, the contribution of this paper is two-fold: As a methodological advance, all concepts, assertions, and derivations are formulated in purely ordinal terms. Moreover, we generalize several previous results by relaxing the restrictions imposed in the literature: In addition to weaker assumptions regarding strategy spaces and preferences in some instances, finiteness of the player set is not assumed in Theorems 1, 3-5.
The next section contains the basic definitions regarding weak orders and ordinal games. We also elaborate on the fact that our assumptions on strategy sets and preferences are more general than the stated assumptions for cardinal games. Section 3 is devoted to potential games. Section 4 is about quasi-supermodular games. Section 5 is about set-valued concepts.
Section 6 offers final remarks.
Preliminaries
We first collect some definitions and properties pertaining to preference relations, in particular weak orders. We then define ordinal games and related concepts, in particular ordinal Nash equilibria. For two nonempty sets S and
Weak Orders
Let X be a nonempty set. A binary relation on X is called a weak order, if it is transitive and strongly complete. The latter means that x y or y x for all x, y ∈ X. For a weak order on X, its asymmetric part , defined by
for all x, z ∈ X, is irreflexive and transitive, and its symmetric part ∼, defined by
for all x, z ∈ X, is an equivalence relation, that is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. A weak order is called a total order, if it is antisymmetric,
has or admits a utility represen-
Then u is called a utility or payoff function representing or a utility representation of or for .
In case X is endowed with a topology τ , we say that is upper semi- An element z ∈ X is called a maximal element of the binary relation on X, if {x ∈ X|x z} = ∅. z is a greatest element, if z x for all x ∈ X. In the case of a weak order, maximal and greatest elements coincide.
For convenient reference, we state the following well known fact. can be generated by means of the well ordering principle.
Example 2. Namely, let be a well order on IR, i.e. is a total order such that every nonempty subset of IR has a minimum. For each r ∈ IR, let 
Ordinal Games
with the following interpretation and properties:
• N = ∅ denotes the set of players.
• Each player i ∈ N has a nonempty set X i of strategies. X = i∈N X i represents the set of joint strategies or strategy profiles.
• Each player i ∈ N has a binary relation i over the joint strategy set X, which reflects his preferences over the outcomes of the game G.
Each binary relation i is assumed to be a weak order.
We denote X −i = j∈N \{i} X j . For a player i ∈ N and a joint strategy
For every player i ∈ N and every joint strategy of his opponents
is the set of best responses, that is the set of maximal strategies for i
Note that every maximal element is a greatest element because i is a weak order. For every player i ∈ N and every joint strategy
the set of better responses or upper contour set -that is the set of strategies that player i weakly prefers to x i , given x or x −i .
Let B : X → → X, x → i∈N B i (x) be the joint better-response relation.
) be the joint best-response relation which maps each joint strategy to its joint best-responses. The set of ordinal Nash equilibria of G is defined by
When appropriate, we shall consider each strategy set X i endowed with a topology. For the remainder of this paragraph, suppose each individual strategy space X i is endowed with a topology τ i and X = i X i is endowed with the corresponding product topology. We say that i is upper semicontin-
continuous on X then it is upper semicontinuous on X and upper semicontinuous on X i for every x −i ∈ X −i .
Ordinal Potential Games
Monderer and Shapley (1996) develop the concept of potential for cardinal 
Voorneveld (2000) introduces and studies best-response potential games, a new class of potential games.
, is a bestresponse potential game if there exists a real-valued function P :
Here, we adapt his definition for ordinal games. An ordinal game G = (N, (X i ) i∈N , ( i ) i∈N ) is a best-response potential game if there exists a quasi-order on X, such that for every i ∈ N , x −i ∈ X −i , we have
where M (x −i ) denotes the set of greatest elements of over X i given x −i ∈ X −i . It is clear from the definition of a best-response potential that (i) each greatest element of is an ordinal Nash equilibrium of G; (ii) the set of ordinal Nash equilibria of G coincides with the set of ordinal Nash equilibria of the ordinal game (N, (X i ) i∈N , ( ) i∈N ) provided is a weak order on X.
Characterization of best-response potentials
Voorneveld (2000) provides a characterization of best-response potential games.
We implement in the ordinal setting the ideas introduced in Voorneveld 
By definition the trivial path (x , and ) is a best-response cycle. Define by the asymmetric part of on X, that is for all x, z ∈ X, First note that the binary relation on X is reflexive and transitive; i.e., it is a quasi-order. We have to show that
. By the absence of a best-response cycle,
it cannot be the case that (
The assertion that (X, ) is a best-response potential for G follows from 
, and 
Existence of Ordinal Nash Equilibria
If we consider best-response potential games in which all but one player have a finite set of strategies, and if we equip the only infinite strategy set with a topology we obtain the following result. , . . .) as follows:
. Note that such a player j(k) exists by the pre- We now define an order on the subsets of a lattice. We use the strong set order ≥ s introduced by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) . Let X be a lattice and let Y and Z be two subsets of X. We say that Y ≥ s Z if for every y ∈ Y and every z ∈ Z, y ∨ z ∈ Y and y ∧ z ∈ Z. We say that a relation ρ : X → → Y from a lattice X to a lattice Y is increasing in x on X if for every x ∈ X,
ρ(x) is a sublattice of Y and if for x ≥ z, ρ(x) ≥ s ρ(z).
If X is a lattice partially ordered by the relation ≥, then subsets of the
b ≥ x} are sublattices of X for all a, b ∈ X. These sets and X are the closed intervals in X. We say that a lattice X is equipped with the interval topology when each closed set can be represented as the intersection of sets that are finite unions of closed intervals in X, including the empty set as the empty union of sets. In other words, the closed intervals constitute a subbase of closed sets of the interval topology.
Next consider an ordinal game. Suppose that each individual strategy set X i is a lattice partially ordered by the relation ≥ i . Then the product sets X and X −i , i ∈ N , are also lattices with respect to the canonical partial orders
x, y ∈ X. We say that the preference i is quasi-supermodular on X i for each
We say that a preference i satisfies the strategic complement property Next pick any x ∈ X. Since M (x) is compact in X, it is also compact as a subspace of X when X is endowed with the product topology. Hence M (x) is also compact as a subspace of X when X is endowed with the interval topology because the product and the interval topology on X coincide.
Lemma 2 Let
Consider any nonempty subset A of M (x). Since X is a complete lattice, sup X A, the supremum of A in X exists. We claim sup X A ∈ M (x). As ob- In an analogous way, one proves inf X A ∈ M (x). Since A was an arbitrary nonempty subset, M (x) is a subcomplete sublattice of X. 3 To summarize, the joint best-response relation M is an increasing correspondence from the complete lattice X to itself and M (x) is a nonempty and subcomplete sublattice for each x ∈ X. The assertion of the theorem follows from Zhou's fixed-point theorem (1994, Theorem 1, p. 297). 
Set-Valued Concepts
Set-valued concepts have proved to have many desirable properties in large classes of cardinal games G = (N, (X i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ). Here we consider two set-valued concepts: the set of rationalizable joint strategies introduced independently by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) and the concept of minimal closed set under some behavior correspondence introduced by Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) . We are going to extend the field of applications of these setvalued concepts from cardinal games to ordinal games. However, in contrast to most of the literature, our definitions involve only pure strategies. The reason is that there is no straightforward and commonly agreed upon extension of ordinal preferences from pure to mixed strategies. The modified concepts have similar properties as the original ones and may be of interest on their own. In fact, Basu (1992) works with pointwise beliefs or conjectures like us.
A strategy for a player is rationalizable if it survives iterated removal of strategies that are never a best response. Rationalizability is a concept that generalizes that of Nash equilibrium. Minimal closed set under some behavior correspondence is a concept that generalizes that of strict Nash equilibrium.
More precisely, Basu and Weibull (1991) introduce first the concept of closed set under rational behavior (curb), a set-valued extension of the strict Nash equilibrium concept for cardinal games G = (N, (X i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ). A product set of pure strategies is closed under rational behavior if it is non-empty and compact and contains the image under the best-response correspondence of every mixed joint strategy with support in this set. A curb set is minimal if it does not contain any proper subset which is curb. As noted by Basu and Weibull (1991) , the set of rationalizable joint strategies is the largest tight curb set. Thus, a minimal curb set and the set of rationalizable joint strategies can be viewed as the two ends of a spectrum. Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) N, (X i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ) where each X i is a compact set in some Euclidean space and every payoff function u i : X → IR is continuous. Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) focus on finite games. We consider a more general setting: In Theorem 4 on the existence of rationalizable joint strategies, each strategy set is endowed with a compact Hausdorff topology and each player's preference i is continuous on X. In Theorem 5 on the existence of minimal closed sets under a behavior relation, each individual strategy space is compact and Hausdorff. Notice that our specification cannot be reduced to the class of games G = (N, (X i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ) considered by Bernheim (1984) and Basu and Weibull (1991) . The reason is that the classical utility representation theorems of Eilenberg (1941) and Debreu (1954 Debreu ( , 1964 ) apply only to separable topological spaces that is topological spaces which include a countable dense subset. 4 In the following subsections, we prove (i) the existence of a nonempty and compact subset of rationalizable joint strategies in ordinal games where each X i is a compact Hausdorff space and each preference i is continuous on X; (ii) the existence of at least one minimal closed set under a behavior relation for the class of ordinal games where each X i is a compact Hausdorff 4 A more recent result due to Monteiro (1987) requires that the underlying topological space is arc-connected and the preferences i are continuous and countably bounded. Recall that the weak order i on X is countably bounded if there is a countable subset Z of X such that for every x ∈ X, there exist
space.
Rationalizable strategies
We shall define rationalizability via the method used by Pearce (1984) . In addition, attention is confined to pointwise beliefs. 
The set of rationalizable strategies of player i ∈ N is defined as
and a joint strategy x ∈ X is rationalizable if x ∈ R := i∈N R i . 
Theorem 4 Let
is nonempty as the union of the sets Bridges and Mehta (1995, Proposition 1.6.2) . Now
as desired.
Closed sets under a behavior relation
Assume that each set of strategies X i , i ∈ N , is a compact Hausdorff space.
For the sake of convenience, we shall take X as the space of beliefs of each player i ∈ N , so that the beliefs for player i include his own strategy. In particular we shall denote the best response relation by M i (x) -though it is functionally independent of the component x i ∈ X i . Let Φ be the class of behavior relations:
for every x ∈ X. More precisely, for each i ∈ N , the individual behavior relation φ i : X → → X i maps each joint strategy x ∈ X to the superset φ i (x) of player i's best responses M i (x). Given any behavior relation φ ∈ Φ, a closed set under φ is a product set (ii) Suppose Z ⊆ X is a tight set closed under M . Then Z is a compact product set with M (Z) = Z. Therefore,
In general, R is not a minimal set closed under M . For instance, if the game G has two strict ordinal Nash equilibria x and x , then {x} and {x } are two disjoint minimal tight sets closed under M .
Final Remarks
The focus of this paper lies on games with players' preferences which are weak orders. Within this broad category of games, we analyze games with ordinal best-response potentials and quasi-supermodular games. We further provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty set of rationalizable joint strategies and of a closed set under a behavior relation.
In the context of cardinal games, it is frequently assumed that the mixed extension of a game exists, that is each cardinal utility representation can be extended to an expected utility functional on the set of joint mixed strategies.
Consequently, the notion of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies can be adopted. Furthermore, the definitions of rationalizable joint strategies and of closed sets under a behavior correspondence may include best responses against mixed strategies. There is no straightforward and commonly agreed upon extension of ordinal preferences from pure to mixed strategies. Therefore our analysis and definitions are confined to pure strategies. In lieu of expected utility comparisons, Fishburn (1978) and Perea et al. (2005) apply first-order stochastic dominance (induced by the ordinal preferences) to joint mixed strategies. This defines a partial order on joint mixed strategies.
As mentioned in the introduction, there exists a sizeable literature on generalized games with incomplete or intransitive preferences. Extensions of our analysis to generalized games and/or games with incomplete or intransitive preferences are left to future research.
